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   Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: The NGOization of Palestine 
Abstract 
In this article we examine the shifting roles played by non-state actors in governing 
areas of limited statehood. In particular we focus on the emergence of voluntary grassroots 
organizations in Palestine and describe how regimes of international development aid 
transformed these organizations into professional non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
that created new forms of colonial control. Based on in-depth interviews with 145 NGO 
members and key stakeholders and a historical analysis of limited statehood in Palestine, we 
found that social relations became disembedded from the local context and re-embedded in 
new relations with international donor organizations resulting in a depoliticized public 
sphere. NGOization of the economy also resulted in new forms of exclusion and inclusion as 
well as contestations between a new class of urban middle class professionals working in 
NGOs and the older generation of activists that were involved in grassroots organizations. 
Our findings have implications for business and human rights and governance in areas of 
limited statehood, in particular how private actors like NGOs are able to exercise power in 
the economy. 
 
Keywords: Governance, NGOization, occupation, resistance, areas of limited 
statehood 
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   Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: The NGOization of Palestine 
“The NGOization of politics threatens to turn resistance into a well mannered, 
reasonable, salaried, 9-to-5 job. With a few perks thrown in. Real resistance has 
real consequences. And no salary”. 
  Arundhati Roy, The End of Imagination  
 
In many parts of the world, particularly in the so-called developing countries state 
capacity to govern effectively is compromised by a variety of historical, political and 
economic factors. Widespread poverty, civil wars, colonial legacies, religious conflicts, 
natural disasters, and market forces often lead to conditions where the state is unable or 
unwilling to fulfill its basic functions: to provide security to its citizens and deliver public 
goods and services necessary for their welfare. Private actors and institutions from both 
domestic and international arenas play a key role in governance in these regions. These actors 
include individual volunteers, charitable organizations, community based organizations, 
international donor agencies, United Nations agencies, religious organizations, international 
and domestic non-governmental organizations, donor countries, and multinational 
corporations (Risse, 2013). In this article we problematize the role of private actors, 
particularly non-governmental organizations1 (NGOs) who have become key players in 
governance. In particular we provide a historical analysis of the role of NGOs in Palestine 
and show how regimes of international developmental aid created new forms of colonial 
governance. Our findings contribute to theories of governance in areas of limited statehood 
by problematizing the role of non-state actors and identifying processes that depoliticize the 
public sphere while undermining resistance to oppressive structures and institutions.  
                                                        
1 We use NGO as an umbrella term while acknowledging the diversity of organizations that constitute this space 
whose activities range from charity, political advocacy, poverty alleviation, women”s empowerment, social 
entrepreneurship, health services, education, environmental protection, legal services and a variety of other 
social services. In the context of Palestine we make a distinction between Volunteer Grassroots Organizations 
(VGOs) that emerged in the early 1920s in the region and the “professional” NGOs that became dominant 
players following the Oslo Accords.  
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Our focus in this article is on governance in Palestine, which can be described as a 
quasi state, an area of limited statehood or more accurately an occupied territory, thus 
providing an ideal context in which to explore non-state regimes of governance. Our article is 
driven by a central research question: how does NGO activity, particularly those of 
“professional” NGOs, in areas of limited statehood create particular forms of governance in 
these spaces? Several theoretical themes emerge from this question including governance, 
development, politicization and resistance, which we will explore in our article. It is also 
important to state at the onset that by resistance we mean popular non-violent forms of 
resistance and civil disobedience, not militancy. Governance in areas of limited statehood is 
structured by international developmental aid, mainly from Western donors who also 
promote the values of liberal democracy to these regions. Over the last 30 years the 
neoliberal turn in the global political economy has seen a shift in the delivery of foreign aid 
where provision of public goods and services is increasingly assigned to the private sector 
(Haddad, 2018; Turner, 2014). Many international donors prefer to channel their funds 
through NGOs rather than through government agencies, which are often perceived to be 
corrupt and inefficient.  
 However, NGOs have also come under criticism in many parts of the world. They 
have been accused of promoting new forms of cultural and economic colonialism (Choudry 
& Kapoor, 2013); being donor driven (Haddad, 2018); coopting local social movements 
(Kraemer et al., 2013); focusing on short-term quantitative outputs (Srinivas, 2009); 
neutralizing dissent and resistance (Banerjee, 2018); undermining collectivity (Merz, 2012); 
and lacking representation and accountability (Dar, 2014; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006). 
Despite these criticisms NGOs remain a powerful player in global governance: there 
are an estimated 10 million NGOs worldwide worth over $1 trillion annually which makes 
the sector the fifth largest economy in the world (Hall-Jones, 2006). Although NGOs are 
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generally not-for-profit enterprises, they are market actors that operate in market economies. 
The marketization of the nonprofit sector and its concomitant shift from providing social 
welfare to promoting social entrepreneurship is a new technology of power that creates 
private authority regimes of governance (Duffield, 2001; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). In this 
article we provide a critical analysis of these regimes and show how the political economy of 
international development aid constructs new relations between the market, state and civil 
society. We contribute to the literature on governance in areas of limited statehood by 
explaining how these relationships create new forms of dependencies and social relations and 
what forms of resistance emerge. 
The article is structured as follows. First, we discuss the concept of areas of limited 
statehood and describe how diminished authority and capacity of the state to govern leads to 
the participation of non-state actors in governance. Second, we provide a historical overview 
of Palestine, which can be considered an area of limited statehood. We describe the 
emergence of voluntary grassroots organizations (VGOs) and their evolution to more 
formalized and professional non-governmental organizations (NGOs) following the Oslo 
Accords and their roles in state and institution building, providing essential services, 
promoting a development agenda and resisting occupation. We then describe our empirical 
study and findings from our analysis of archival data and in-depth interviews with key 
respondents. We conclude our article by discussing the implications of our findings for 
business and human rights and governance in areas of limited statehood. 
 
Limited Statehood and Governance 
Areas of limited statehood are those parts of a country “in which central authorities 
(governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions or in which the 
legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking, at least temporarily” (Risse, 
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2011: 4). We adopt Crouch’s (2005: 20) definition of governance as “those mechanisms by 
which the behavioral regularities that constitute institutions are maintained and enforced”. 
Following Krasner and Risse (2014) we differentiate between statehood as institutional 
structures of authority to govern and state capacity to govern with respect to providing public 
goods and services. In providing institutional structures of authority the state is also a 
legitimate purveyor of violence, which it can deploy to protect its citizens from domestic and 
international threats but also to quell dissent (legitimate or otherwise). When state 
governments do not have a monopoly on the use of violence and/or lack the capacity to 
deliver public goods and services in certain parts of their territory those areas can be 
considered as areas of limited statehood. In the context of Palestine, the authority of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) to govern is partial because its security apparatus can be rescinded 
by the state of Israel at any time (Turner, 2014).  Palestine thus represents an area of limited 
statehood where the state lacks effective authority and control resulting in diminished 
domestic sovereignty.  
Areas of limited statehood do not descend into complete anarchy. When states are 
limited in their ability to govern other actors both domestic and international, often with 
competing interests and priorities, step in to fill the void. Research on areas of limited 
statehood has focused on identifying the conditions that enable effective and legitimate 
governance, where effectiveness refers to the delivery of collective goods to relevant 
populations and legitimacy as the “license to govern or the right to rule” (Börzel et al., 2018: 
5). Rather than categorize entire nations as “weak” or “strong” states which is the inevitable 
consequence of conceptualizing the modern (Western) nation state as a democratic, capitalist 
state governed by the rule of law it is important to make a conceptual distinction between 
statehood, legitimacy and governance (Risse & Stollenwerk, 2018). Social trust between 
different actors, legitimacy of the governors and design of governance institutions appear to 
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be key determinants of effective governance, where trust and legitimacy are assumed to be 
outcomes of deliberative processes involving governance actors in a democratic sphere (Risse 
& Stollenwerk, 2018). Legitimacy is a crucial factor that determines success of any 
governance arrangement in areas of limited statehood. Scholars argue it is important to 
distinguish between empirical legitimacy (the extent to which the governed voluntarily 
comply with governing institutions) and normative legitimacy (the justification of legitimacy 
according to “universal moral and normative standards”) (Krasner & Risse, 2014: 550). 
Although they are not elected bodies, NGOs that participate in deliberative democratic 
processes are presumed to have “moral legitimacy” because they follow procedural norms of 
“civil behavior” and “consensual behavior” (Baur & Palazzo, 2011). The problem with this 
formulation of legitimacy is a homogenizing of the governed where voluntary compliance 
becomes the key goal of governance without an analysis of coercive power structures, 
processes and class formations that produce “voluntary” compliance. In Palestine the 
problem is further compounded by Israeli occupation: while the occupation is certainly not 
legitimate, it seems to have consolidated itself through cooptation and coercion to the point 
where the prospect of the so-called two-state solution seems more distant than ever. 
Areas of limited statehood are also recipients of international development aid, 
mainly from Western donors. For instance, in 2014 development aid amounting to $19 billion 
was channeled through NGOs to deliver services like humanitarian aid, education, healthcare 
and sanitation (Beisheim et al., 2018). In distributing aid NGOs are also charged with 
promoting democratic values, creating an active civil society, and provide good governance. 
However, there are tensions between NGOs and the communities they serve especially when 
development projects are driven by donor conditions. Participation of civil society actors in 
governance does not necessarily lead to a democratic public sphere (Cooke & Kothari, 2001) 
and our study reveals the hegemonic structures and processes that constitute the sphere of 
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NGO engagement. Before we examine the role of NGOs in governance, it is necessary to 
provide a brief history of Palestine’s struggle for independence, which began with partition 
and the creation of the state of Israel and the subsequent dispossession and displacement of 
the Palestinian peoples in 1948. In the next section we describe the organization and 
evolution of resistance to occupation, attempts at self-governing, mobilization of 
communities and participation of civil society at key historical events. Voluntary grassroots 
organizations that emerged after partition and the professional NGOs that currently 
participate in governance are both outcomes of particular political and historical processes in 
Palestine.  
 
A Political History of Palestine: Dispossession, (non) Statehood and International Aid 
Regimes 
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a comprehensive history of Palestine and the 
Palestine-Israel conflict which has been going on since 1948. There are several books that 
provide a comprehensive and critical analysis of these histories (see for example Haddad, 
2018; Peters & Newman, 2013; Said, 1992; 1995). Our position in this article is to focus on 
the political, economic and social realities in Palestine. We are interested in learning how 
NGOs first emerged, how they engaged in governance and how their roles have shifted over 
the last 60 years. To trace these shifts it is necessary to analyze the broader historical and 
political environments and events that have shaped both the conflict and the actors that 
operate in the region. Table 1 provides a brief timeline of Palestine’s history. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
In 1947 the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine recommended the creation of 
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independent Arab and Jewish states with a Special International Regime for the city of 
Jerusalem. However, soon after the adoption of the resolution war broke out, which was the 
first phase of the 1948 Palestine war and also marked the beginning of the Nakba 
(catastrophe) for Palestinian peoples. The Nakba resulting in the dispossession and expulsion 
of more than 700,000 Palestinians, comprising nearly 60% of the population, from their 
homes as well as the depopulation and destruction of over 530 Palestinian villages (Haas, 
2013). 
The earliest grassroots organizations in Palestine emerged in the 1920s following 
British occupation. These grassroots organizations included Islamic and Christian charities, 
community based organizations, youth clubs, women’s organizations, and solidarity groups 
that supported local communities’ efforts to remain on their lands (Payes, 2005). The 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), an umbrella organization consisting of a number 
of political parties and factions was founded in 1964 with the stated goal of liberating 
Palestine through armed struggle. The policy of armed struggle was abandoned in 1993 after 
the signing of the Oslo Accords.  
The first generation of grassroots organizations was founded by political parties in 
Palestine following the 1967 occupation2 and mainly comprised local charitable associations 
who provided assistance to refugees, the injured, prisoners, families of killed soldiers and 
families whose homes had been demolished. Over time and given the absence of a stable 
government with public authority, these voluntary grassroots organizations (VGOs) became 
collective enterprises that provided services in health, water, agriculture, arts, education, law 
and human rights with a particular focus on vulnerable communities. However, the delivery 
of services to communities in no way deflected from the central national vision of these 
                                                        
2 In 1967 Israel captured and occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights and the 
Sinai Peninsula. 
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organizations, which was to secure an independent state, free from occupation coupled with 
the right of return for refugees who were deported following the Nakba in 1948. The broad 
array of VGOs included political parties, women’s unions, community based organizations, 
labor unions, student unions, cooperatives, clubs and charities, representing nearly all 
segments of Palestinian community. These VGOs operated as informal decentralized social 
structures with a strong left wing political ideology, committed to struggles against 
occupation while attempting to improve the socio-economic conditions of impoverished 
communities. They relied mainly on volunteers and interacted directly with the local 
communities who saw them as organizations that represented their needs and aspirations for 
independence. 
A turning point in the history of Palestine was the First Intifada (uprising), which 
broke out in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1987. The Intifada was a spontaneous people’s 
protest movement against occupation involving civil disobedience through general strikes, 
demonstrations, occupying check points, lobbying and advocacy, public demonstrations of 
solidarity with families whose houses were demolished by the army, boycott of Israeli 
products, refusal to pay taxes and refusal to work in Israeli settlements. The popular uprising 
was seen as a legitimate protest both locally and internationally and VGOs played a key role 
in mobilizing Palestinians in the struggle against Israeli occupation during the intifada.  
Two more events significantly reshaped the function and roles of VGOs and 
transformed governance in Palestine. In 1993 the Oslo Accords were signed between Israel 
and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. A new Palestinian Authority (PA) was created 
with limited self-governance in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a 5-year interim 
period until a final settlement was negotiated. The PA was tasked with ensuring security and 
was given authority over health, education, social services and tourism sectors. The PA could 
also raise direct taxes and elect a representative council. However, the PA was far from a 
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state –while it could “legitimately” use violence to maintain law and order (a state-like 
function) it had no control over its external borders, which were still controlled by Israel; its 
governable territory was not continuous, it had limited sovereignty over its own land, water, 
and minerals or access to the sea and it did not have its own currency (Khan, 2004). Among 
the Palestinian activists and VGOs the Oslo Accords created much controversy because Israel 
still occupied parts of Palestinian territories while the PA was given very limited governing 
powers over parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. More importantly all the water in the 
region (a key bone of contention during the conflicts) was controlled by Israel. Many 
Palestinians saw the Accords as a betrayal of nationalist vision and the PA as a creation of the 
international community designed to take over the administrative duties of occupation. But 
there was hope and expectation that it was a first step towards full statehood. The PA’s state 
building agenda can be described as a program “predicated upon delivering growth and 
prosperity without any strategy for resistance or challenge to the parameters of occupation” 
(Khalidi & Samour, 2011: 8).  
Following the Oslo Accords international development aid to the Palestinian 
territories increased dramatically. Between 1999 and 2008, international aid to the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip increased by over 600% to $3.25 billion per year. During the same time 
period, external aid to Palestinian NGOs increased by over 500% from $48 million in 1999 to 
$257 million in 2008 (De Voir & Tartir, 2009). The number of NGOs also mushroomed after 
Oslo and the period witnessed the transformation of grassroots mobilization to professionally 
managed NGOs as a result of conditional international funding. By the mid-1990s more than 
30% of domestic NGOs were dependent on funding from international donors who began to 
exert greater influence on local developmental projects (Hanafi & Tabar, 2003). Projects 
were structured around donor priorities with a focus on budgets and costs that transformed 
the structure of the NGOs and reshaped relationships between members and their 
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organizations and between the members themselves creating internal factions that competed 
for funding. Financial support for NGOs became increasingly conditional on demonstrating 
“professionalization” through standardization and reporting tools that focused on “civic” 
modes of action and service delivery rather than promoting an explicit political agenda 
(Merz, 2012). The process of professionalization also transformed the nature of volunteerism, 
which was the fundamental basis of Palestinian grassroots organizations prior to the Oslo 
Accords. The professionalization of NGOs was also an outcome of neoliberal development 
aid regimes where NGOs were required to demonstrate “expertise” in development, gender, 
health and education rather than advocate for citizenship rights.  
The second event was the sudden outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000. 
Much more violent than the first, it shifted the activities of the NGOs to providing emergency 
relief and medical services to the tens of thousands of Palestinians that were affected. During 
this time the PLO broke into several infighting factions leading to a major split between the 
dominant political party Fatah and the more radical group Hamas, with the latter 
unexpectedly winning the Palestinian Legislative Council elections held in the aftermath of 
the Intifada in 2006. This resulted in a complete split between the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank: while both technically fell under the jurisdiction of the PA, following the 2006 election 
Gaza was governed by Hamas while the West Bank continued to be governed by Fatah with 
Israel controlling the borders between the two regions. The Gaza Strip was placed under a 
blockade by Israel, which continues to the present day.  
Thus, the nature and scope of civil society participation in state building in Palestine 
is inextricably linked with Israeli occupation, the influx of developmental aid with conditions 
attached and the Palestinian Authority, which was created without consultation or 
participation at the domestic level. Aid, mainly from Western donors plays a key role in 
shaping governance in areas of limited statehood. Recipient countries are required to 
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structure their policy processes, institutions and prioritize policy initiatives based on donor 
imperatives (Taghdisi-Rad, 2011). These political conditionalities along with their associated 
quantitative performance indicators were subsequently imposed on organizations that were 
charged with disbursing the aid: mainly local NGOs, who were required to follow reporting 
practices that reflected donor priorities. Donors’ funding conditions also involve boycotting 
any organizations that had connections with religious associations, however democratically 
representative and legitimate they may be (Jad, 2007).     
For instance, following the directives of their government the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), one of the largest aid organizations in the world, 
required all organizations receiving funding to furnish an Anti-Terrorism Certificate (ATC) 
before signing any funding contract. The terms of the certificate are so restrictive that almost 
any act of resistance or engagement with nationalist politics could be construed as terrorism, 
thus depoliticizing the role of NGOs and criminalizing resistance (Dana, 2015). Project 
proposals also tended to eschew “political” aims and any criticism of Israeli policies in a 
project proposal diminished its chance of being funded (Jad, 2007). To fulfill ATC conditions 
NGOs responsible for aid disbursement needed to complete onerous reporting requirements 
including providing personal information about their staff, partner organizations and 
subcontractors. NGOs found themselves in an unenviable position of being required to run 
terrorist background checks on the very people and communities with whom they were trying 
to establish trust and build relationships. Meeting ATC requirements resulted in diverting 
funds and resources away from critical operations to complying with administrative 
requirements, eroded trust in local communities and “undermined the US government’s own 
investments in building local capacities for peace” (Lazarus & Gawerc, 2015: 68). Thus, even 
humanitarian assistance became developmental aid – for people to be eligible for this aid they 
need to demonstrate apolitical attitudes and behaviors (Duffield, 2001). 
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Critics of current aid regimes also point to a lack of understanding of the complexities 
of conflict situations by donor agencies. Following the Oslo Accords, international agencies 
treated the Occupied Palestinian Territories as a “post-conflict” zone at a time when the 
Israeli government followed a policy of expanding settlements and increasing the number of 
checkpoints, which eventually led to the second Intifada. A temporary decline in military 
casualties does not imply that the conflict is over – a definitive post-conflict situation means 
an end to all “offensive military strategies accompanied by economic improvements, political 
stability, enhanced livelihoods with the re-instating of economic, political and government 
institutions” (Taghdisi-Rad, 2011:43). This clearly did not reflect the situation in Palestine 
after the signing of the Oslo Accords. Withdrawal from certain Palestinian territories by 
occupying forces did not translate to complete sovereignty and self-determination because 
Israel still retained control over key structural aspects of the Palestinian economy including 
movement of people and goods, imports and exports, customs revenues, supply of electricity 
and water, and monetary policy. Thus, donor driven goals of “development” and “good 
governance” were seriously constrained by the structural power of occupation. Despite being 
one of the largest recipients of aid in the world ($24.6 billion between 1993 and 2013) 
poverty and unemployment has increased in Palestine (Springer, 2015). In fact, some scholars 
argue that developmental aid for Palestine under occupation has resulted in de-development, 
a process where “normal economic relations are impaired or abandoned preventing any 
logical or rational arrangement of the economy or its constituent parts diminishing productive 
capacity and precluding sustainable growth” (Roy, 1995: 128).  
Our discussion so far has focused at the broader level of political economy. What is 
needed is an analysis of the relationships between NGOs and their beneficiaries as well as 
with their international donor organizations that enabled the shift from grassroots 
organizations to professional organizations. Certainly international developmental aid was an 
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antecedent, but in what ways did external funding change the nature and aims of the NGOs? 
How did it influence organizational members attitudes and behaviors? What were the 
outcomes? To answer these questions we turn to our empirical analysis. 
 
Methodology 
To answer these questions we conducted an empirical study involving extensive historical 
analysis of archival data (annual reports, brochures, project reports and manuals), in-depth 
interviews with NGO members and other key informants as well as observations of internal 
meetings, meetings with stakeholders, field visits at project sites, conferences and project 
launch events. The first author conducted interviews in two stages – in the first stage 20 key 
informants were interviewed. These informants had extensive knowledge about NGOs and 
the political historical context of Palestine. Informants included lawyers, medical doctors, 
academics, researchers, and consultants. The interviews covered both broad and specific 
areas - from the history of the Palestine-Israel conflict, to the emergence of the PA, the local 
political situation, international aid, the range of NGO activities, challenges and 
opportunities. These preliminary interviews were the basis of selecting the sample of NGOs 
that would form the basis of the empirical data. Five NGOs operating in the areas of 
education, health, art and culture, law and human rights, and agriculture were selected. The 
NGOs represented a combination of older and younger organizations that enabled us to track 
their evolution from the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s and following the Oslo Accords from 
the mid 1990s to 2015. In total 145 interviews were conducted over a 10-month period in the 
field. Table 2 provides an overview of the sample. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
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Interviews centered around three themes: the story of individual NGO members (their 
role, history with the organization, attitudes and perceptions of the political situation; the 
organizational story (organizational history and structure, funding and budgets, main scope of 
activities, changes experienced); and the broader contextual story where we explored their 
perceptions of key global changes that impacted the NGO sector. Interviews lasted from 90 
minutes to 3 hours. 
Based on our interviews and archival data we reconstructed the history of the five 
NGOs. We also conducted validity checks with key informants to assess if our narratives 
matched their accounts. Any inconsistences that arose were resolved through further 
discussion and triangulation with other data sources. Open coding of the interviews resulted 
in a total of 70 initial categories. Further analysis involved combining categories into themes 
based on similarities and differences. Through a process of axial coding we developed second 
order codes, which we then aggregated into theoretical dimensions as shown in Figure 1. 
Table 3 provides illustrative quotes for the key themes that emerged from our analysis.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
We now discuss our findings based on this analytical structure. 
 
Findings 
The purpose of our empirical study was to understand how professionalization of NGOs in 
areas of limited statehood created particular forms of governance. As we will show the 
emergence of professional NGOs depoliticized the public sphere undermining resistance and 
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normalizing occupation. We will discuss our findings in the loose historical timeline that we 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
The Early Years: Voluntary Grassroots Organizing after the Nakba 
Before the creation of the PA grassroots organizations provided services in health, water, 
agriculture, and education to communities. However, the broader national vision of a free 
Palestine remained central to these organizations since they were founded by political parties 
with the aim of mobilizing people against occupation and claiming the right of return for 
displaced refugees. One respondent stated: “we conceived our grassroots work with farmers 
as a social cause fighting for our liberation… agriculture was a tool but we targeted broader 
concerns. It was more political work, to mobilize people for the Palestinian cause” (General 
Director, NGO1). Delivering agricultural services coincided with discussions about how to 
mobilize against land confiscations. Service provision was seen as an explicitly political 
practice: for example poverty was portrayed as a direct result of occupation and humanitarian 
aid was not considered passive but embedded in social, economic and political injustices that 
promoted a sense of solidarity and collective empowerment (Dana, 2015). 
 These early organizations provided services to the most marginalized communities. 
One respondent stated: “we were seven medical doctors who committed to go every week to 
villages in one small car and very basic instruments to treat patients” (Former General 
Director, NGO2). As the political and economic conditions in the region worsened and 
escalating Israeli military action resulted in demolition of Palestinian houses, confiscation of 
lands, and damage of already fragile infrastructure the VGOs faced increased pressure in 
delivering services. But they maintained close and regular interactions with local 
communities despite the expansion of checkpoints and efforts to limit their movement.  
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 Collectivity was a key characteristic of the VGOs. The General Assembly, the 
supreme body that governed grassroots organizations allowed all members to engage in 
dialogue and make collective decisions regardless of their party affiliations. According to one 
respondent: “Those who sat around the table during the general assembly meetings were 
farmers & other people who could express what they need…it was not mechanistic 
representation by any means, on the contrary, it was actual representation epitomized by 
activities we designed” (Project Officer, NGO1). Identifying local needs was a collective 
process instead of a top down approach that is typical of most large donor driven projects. 
Local communities were not seen as beneficiaries or recipients of aid but as participants in 
projects.    
 Volunteerism was the engine of grassroots organizing. One respondent stated: 
“volunteering was not something naïve, rather founded on real aspirations….we wanted 
volunteerism to become the main value which reflects our national culture, to be our strength 
to face the political realities of our situation” (General Director, NGO3).  Funding for VGOs 
came mainly from the membership fees paid by the General Assembly members with some 
local cash and in-kind donations. An important principle was the refusal of any external 
funding: “we rejected any external funding, it was our philosophy not to accept any foreign 
funding, and we particularly refused funding aimed to improve the living conditions of 
Palestinians under occupation” (Branch Director, NGO1). However, some modest funding 
was accepted mainly from European groups who expressed solidarity with the Palestinian 
cause. Post-Oslo saw a significant transformation of these grassroots organizations in their 
relationships with local communities as well as in the scope and direction of their activities. 
 
The Emergence of the Professional NGO 
The transformation of the explicitly political state building role of these grassroots 
 
 
18 
organizations to a more civic service delivery role is inextricably linked with the creation of 
the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the subsequent flow of international aid. The original 
vision of a Palestine free from occupation became subordinated to implementing aid projects, 
which resulted in these organizations becoming disembedded from popular movements 
(Hanafi & Tabar, 2003). What began as a grassroots anti-colonial movement was transformed 
by international developmental aid to a welfare provision service operated by professional 
NGOs run by local elites with closer links to international institutions than to their local 
communities resulting in the latter’s further exclusion and marginalization (Dana, 2015). 
Palestinian grassroots organizations post-Oslo were criticized by Western donors as being too 
“politicized” and development became the new peace building mantra instead of resistance 
against occupation. As one respondent put it: “being politically aware and linked to political 
parties was a source of pride for all; it was the guide that framed our activities….but 
nowadays it has become a requirement to separate politics, but we attempt always to 
articulate and emphasize the separation” (Director, NGO3). 
To become eligible recipients of international aid grassroots organizations had to 
essentially re-define their purpose to improving living conditions under occupation as 
opposed to resisting occupation and also demonstrate their “professionalism”. Governance 
structures changed from popular committees to more hierarchical organization forms. Writing 
project proposals, fluency in English, quantification of easily measurable outputs and 
monitoring became major criteria to assess NGOs rather than their impact on local 
communities. Number of workshops or training programs conducted became key 
performance indicators regardless of what the training actually achieved. One respondent 
expressed her frustration at the donor driven development agenda: “We were working before 
in development by protecting land and resources and preventing land grabbing, but now it 
feels we do not work in development anymore. Now development means more paper work. 
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We work on proposal writing and filling out forms and on procedural issues because of our 
dependency on donors’ money” (Project Officer, NGO1). 
International funding also shifted the direction of accountability upward where NGOs 
were more focused on meeting donor requirements than on the needs of their beneficiaries. 
Donor priorities became more influential in project selection and design. As one respondent 
commented: “our organization became like a supermarket where we choose items to import 
and sell, for example gender training, rights-based approach are all imported” (Former 
employee, NGO4). Gender workshops were often seen as a Western imposition. As one 
respondent put it: “Gender is more a trend; it is fundable. I’m with gender equality in 
principle, however, I do not like how the trainers deliver awareness sessions. They project 
Palestinians as oppressors and that’s a superior and false view, which I reject. Gender 
activities were introduced to Palestine through the elite, who are not oppressed, to me that 
does not make any sense….why do we not address the oppression of women by the Israeli 
occupation? During military attacks, how many women die and how many women had to 
deliver babies at the checkpoints because they were not allowed to cross? Is this not a gender 
issue?” (Chairman, NGO2). Gender empowerment workshops led by Western NGOs also 
rendered invisible the mass mobilization efforts of Palestinian women during the intifadas, 
which was the backbone of the anti-colonial nationalist struggle against occupation (Dana, 
2015). 
Project based budgeting changed employment relations and social relations between 
NGO members. NGOs began to classify their staff based on core budget contracts and project 
budget contracts. The latter was time bound which meant individuals approaching the end of 
their contracts had to focus their efforts to renew them or find other employment. While 
permanent contracts were the most desirable they created competitive relations between what 
used to be cooperative relations between members and fostered a culture of individualism 
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instead of collectivity. One respondent commented: “the contract is sort of a dream for me, if 
I get it, then I feel secure. Most of the time I feel how unfair it is that I do not have a 
permanent contract, though I feel I am eligible” (Advocacy Officer, NGO2). A new 
generation of technocrats became responsible for implementing aid programs through NGOs. 
The major preoccupation of this new class of elites was to ensure maintenance of their 
salaries, renewal of funding contracts and identifying projects and target communities that 
would meet donor requirements.  
  
The Business of Human Rights 
A key governance challenge in areas of limited statehood is protection of human rights as 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 
1948. Research on human rights violations in Palestine at the hands of Israeli forces, settlers 
and the PA security services indicates that despite a thriving human rights industry in 
Palestine most Palestinians are worse off socially, economically and politically (Allen, 2013). 
Legitimate and authoritative political structures can enforce human rights but when these 
same structures are responsible for human rights violations in Palestine there can be little 
accountability for these violations. The discourse shifts to the provision of human rights 
under occupation without challenging the political and economic status quo. 
 Palestinians have endured and continue to endure different forms of violence: direct, 
structural, instrumental and epistemic violence are part of their daily lives. From spraying 
Palestinian homes with sewage water; burying nuclear waste on Palestinian lands; building 
illegal settlements; confiscating land using a variety of legal maneuvers (including applying 
laws dating back to the Ottoman empire); controlling access to water and electricity; 
demolishing Palestinian homes; destroying citrus and olive trees planted by Palestinian 
farmers just before the harvest; providing government incentives for Israeli citizens to 
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relocate to illegally constructed settlements; using multiple checkpoints to restrict movement 
of Palestinians; arbitrary detention of trucks carrying fresh produce at checkpoints until the 
produce rots – the list is endless. All this of course is in addition to more direct forms of 
violence including “targeted” and “extrajudicial killings”, arbitrary detentions of Palestinians 
and allegations of torture by the Israel Defense Forces as well as by the Palestinian Authority. 
One of the NGOs in our sample is a respected law and human rights organization but 
most respondents were cynical if not suspicious about the human rights industry in Palestine. 
Despite decades of meticulous documentation of human rights violations by the armed forces, 
arbitrary arrests of Palestinian citizens, demolition of Palestinian homes and illegal settlement 
construction in the West Bank continues unabated. One respondent recounted an incident: 
“my son was kidnapped from his university by PA security forces, and he was tortured, and 
jailed for a couple of months without any charge. His case was documented but then nothing 
happened. The worst part was that later our house was raided and my son again was 
arrested this time by the Israeli armed forces, and again they documented this, yet nothing 
happened. I did not even hear from them again after they visited me to take my testimony” 
(Beneficiary, NGO5). Another respondent commented: “whose rights are we talking about? 
We can give lectures to our people about their rights, and then they go out and get arrested 
for no reason, or they are stopped at checkpoints and cannot reach their houses or lands. For 
example I have a land located close to the wall, I was not allowed to enter my land for 14 
years. We live under occupation, and all these rights based approaches will not move a 
stone” (Director, NGO3). 
However, other respondents felt that despite its limited effectiveness human rights 
discourses had the potential to produce better outcomes. For some the process of 
documenting violations provided a sense of agency. One respondent commented: “my 
belonging to my cause as a Palestinian motivates me to be involved in the quest of human 
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rights. At the personal level, I was detained, tortured, that’s part of daily life of an occupied 
nation. For me it is important to resort to international law as a nation under occupation, 
even if there are no tangible results in the foreseeable future. But I hinder the work of the 
occupying force when I file a legal case and go to court and ask for the policeman or solider 
who committed the violations to attend the court. This helps me feel good” (Head of Training 
Unit, NGO5). 
Some NGOs engaged with business to draw attention to human rights violations and 
pressurized them to withdraw investment or change suppliers from the occupied territories. 
The director of local accountability commented: “by making the link between human rights 
violations and business, we can show how the Israeli occupation is a colonial regime that 
confiscates lands and expand settlements which is a direct violation of international law. 
Many companies work in these illegal settlements, and we document that. We hope to put 
pressure on those companies to withdraw their investment” (Director of local accountability 
department, NGO5). 
Another respondent commented: “we documented investments that international 
companies had with Israeli companies in the settlements to show how they contributed to 
occupation. These companies were using our natural resources and minerals from the Dead 
Sea to manufacture and sell cosmetics abroad, while depriving us of those resources, which 
is a violation of our human rights. By pressurizing companies and states not to buy products 
made in the settlements we are trying to criminalize occupation and change the policies of 
companies that invest in Israeli occupation. We also approach the courts in the countries of 
the investing companies, where international human law is better enforced” (International 
accountability department, NGO5). 
Our findings indicate that Palestinian NGOs engage with business through human 
rights discourses. Activists have also targeted service providers by highlighting their 
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discriminatory service practices in water provision, sanitation, and waste removal that are 
provided solely to settlements while excluding neighboring Palestinian communities. A UN 
report on the impact of business in the occupied territories stated that “business enterprises 
have, directly and indirectly, enabled, facilitated and profited from the construction and 
growth of the settlements” (OHCHR, 2014). The report identified several business activities 
that “raised particular human rights violations concerns” including “supply of equipment 
facilitating construction of settlements and their associated checkpoints; supply of 
surveillance equipment for settlements; supply of equipment for the demolition of housing 
and property, the destruction of agricultural farms, greenhouses, olives groves and crops; 
banking and financial operations helping to develop, expand or maintain settlements and their 
activities, including loans for housing and the development of businesses; and the use of 
natural resources, in particular water and land, for business purposes” (OHCHR, 2014). 
While business firms cannot be expected to play a direct role in seeking a political 
solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict they may feel the need to justify their presence and 
activities in the region. Some companies have chosen to divest from the occupied territories –
for example, the Netherlands’ biggest pension fund PGGM, citing its “social responsibility 
policies” divested from Israeli banks that offered financing for settlement construction in the 
West Bank. Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, the world’s largest, excluded Israeli companies 
involved in the building of settlements in the West Bank (Browning, 2014). Boycotting 
products manufactured in the settlements and pressurizing investors to divest from companies 
operating in the settlements are also central to the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) 
campaign launched by 170 Palestinian civil society groups in 2005. The BDS movement calls 
for an end to occupation, dismantling the wall and illegal settlements, full equality for 
Palestinian citizens of Israel and rights for return of Palestinian refugees. While some 
countries have called the BDS campaign discriminatory (even the PA does not support a 
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general boycott but backs boycotting products and companies from illegal settlements), a few 
multinational and Israeli corporations (Veolia, G4S, Sodastream for example) have been 
targeted by BDS and activists claim that foreign direct investment into Israel dropped 46% in 
2014 as a result of the campaign (Browning, 2014). However, mainstreaming responsible 
investment is a challenge at the best of times and in the extreme political polarization of 
Palestine-Israel relations it remains to be seen if the BDS campaign has long-term 
consequences. 
Returning to the questions that informed our study, we found that international 
developmental aid played a key role in transforming grassroots movements to professional 
NGOs in Palestine resulting in depoliticizing the public sphere. Practices of 
professionalization and discourses of development also created new economic and social 
realities that resulted in a normalization of occupation where the focus was on improving 
living conditions under occupation rather than resistance. Grassroots organizations’ 
longstanding strategy of resistance to occupation was transformed into policies of “good 
governance”, “transparency”, and “accountability” that enabled depoliticized and 
deradicalized NGOs to operate under occupation. We elaborate on these themes in the next 
section and discuss the theoretical implications of our findings for business-society relations 
and for governance in areas of limited statehood. 
 
Discussion  
Our study has explained processes of depoliticization and normalization of occupation 
resulting from professionalization of NGOs as well as processes of state building through 
activism and advocacy that lead to resistance to occupation. These themes contribute to 
theory development in areas of limited statehood, particularly on the role of non-state actors 
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in governance by revealing their shortcomings of institutional and state building efforts, as 
we elaborate below. 
 
Implications for Business-Society Relations 
Our findings problematize the ongoing professionalization and marketization of civil society 
actors. While professionalism, efficiency and market focus are desirable attributes that add 
value for businesses there is a concern they could negatively impact democratic 
accountability and citizenship (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). As we have seen donor 
conditionalities have made NGOs more “business like” in their approach. More research is 
needed to understand how the marketization of NGOs changes relationships between them 
and the communities they serve. Professionalization and marketization of NGOs necessitate a 
shift to a contract based approach to governance with a focus on competition for resources 
and performance measurement. While such an approach can benefit NGOs by enhancing 
their legitimacy with donors and consolidating their funding base it can diminish their 
advocacy efforts and role in building a vibrant civil society. Research on the social role of 
business through discourses of corporate social responsibility has a long history, however less 
is known about the effects of the business-like NGO. How do NGO members negotiate trade-
offs between meeting donor needs and demands for advocacy from their communities? What 
are the consequences for marginalized communities when market actors like business firms 
attempt to play a more “social” role and social actors like NGOs adopt a market persona? 
Our findings also have implications for business and human rights. In its report 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights the Office of the United Nations High 
Commission for Human Rights highlighted the risks to business enterprises operating in 
conflict zones warning that “managers of business enterprises may face prosecution in a 
personal capacity” for human rights violations by their business firms and that the “risk of 
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corporate and individual responsibility for crimes perpetrated in the context of an armed 
conflict is thus an element of growing enterprise in a business enterprise’s assessment of the 
range of risks associated with it activities” (OHCHR, 2011). Managing human rights risks for 
businesses becomes more complicated in areas of limited statehood and conflict zones 
because it is the responsibility of the “host state” to protect human rights. In the context of 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), especially within illegally constructed Israeli 
settlements, the term “host state” is both ambiguous and misleading – how does a business 
manage its human rights risks when both the occupying power and the PA have been accused 
of human rights violations (Azarova, 2018)? In its report on the human rights situation in 
Palestine the UN High Commission for Human Rights directed companies “operating or 
seeking to operate in Israeli settlements in the OPT to demonstrate that they neither support 
the continuation of an international illegality nor are complicit in human rights abuses; that 
they can effectively prevent or mitigate human rights risks; and are able to account for their 
efforts in this regard – including, where necessary, by terminating their business interests or 
activities” (OHCHR, 2014). As discussed earlier some companies have chosen to terminate 
their activities in illegally constructed settlements while others have chosen to remain citing 
their record of employing Palestinians in their workforce as an effort to bring “economic 
peace” in the region. More research is needed to understand organizational processes that 
influence a business firm’s decision on how it continues to operate in conflict zones. 
 
Implications for Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood 
Research on areas of limited statehood has highlighted the important role that NGOs play in 
governance without identifying the conditions that enable these organizations to produce 
outcomes that help or harm local communities (Beisheim et al., 2018). Our findings indicate 
that imposition of Western notions of civil society and good governance do little to advance 
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the political aspirations of communities but instead through a process of depoliticization 
impedes local efforts to build more representative forms of governance. Our article provides 
empirical evidence that the activities of these so-called “values based” NGOs depoliticize the 
public sphere and in the case of Palestine normalize occupation. 
Descriptions of governance in areas of limited statehood as “multi-level governance 
linking inter-and transnational actors to local ones in a variety of rule and authority 
structures” (Risse, 2013: 99) obscure the structural and discursive power relations that 
constitute governance in Palestine. Power of international governance in Palestine is 
exercised through settler colonialism and neoliberal development regimes (Seidel & Tartir, 
2019). State building under occupation and settler-colonialism has resulted in a de facto 
single state, which resembles more a Bantustan than a sovereign state. The PA is also 
complicit because it has been partially coopted by international donor agencies to help 
maintain Israeli security thus normalizing occupation The civic needs of Palestinians such as 
education, health and sanitation are managed by the PA while the Israeli authorities continue 
their policy of settlement consolidation and expansion through “security coordination” with 
the PA’s security forces that further marginalizes Palestinians. 
Our findings also problematize the complex nature of the legitimacy of governance in 
areas of limited statehood. There is an assumption that losing the legitimacy war can 
somehow overcome military domination enabling oppressed populations to meet their 
political aspirations, as the dismantling of the apartheid state in South Africa has shown 
(Falk, 2019). That is certainly not the case in Palestine where apart from the illegitimate 
Israeli occupation, even the ruling PA in the West Bank is being seen as lacking in legitimacy 
by many Palestinians not least because of the way it was created by the international 
community but also because of wide spread corruption within the PA’s institutions (Dana, 
2015). Voluntary compliance of the governed as the basis for empirical legitimacy becomes 
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problematic because it obscures the coercive and choiceless aspects of “voluntary” 
compliance. While areas of limited statehood scholars acknowledge that the imposition of a 
Western governance package that assumes consolidated statehood on non-Western sites is 
flawed, their prescription to provide “governance assistance rather than state-building” 
(Risse, 2013: 82) is also flawed, because as our study shows providing governance assistance 
does not help communities resistance oppressive regimes but instead normalizes occupation 
while undermining resistance. Inclusive institutional building as advocated by areas of 
limited statehood scholars still suffers from the limitations of what are still very Western 
notions of deliberative democracy. 
If Israeli occupation of Palestine is a form of settler colonialism then the relationship 
between domestic NGOs and international donors can be seen as a form of internal 
colonialism where the colonization is now done by local elites whose interests are linked to 
international donor agencies. Palestinians that are unable to access these networks find 
themselves further marginalized and hindered in their ability to meet their political 
aspirations. Our findings indicate there is a need to decolonize governance in areas of limited 
statehood. This will be a complex and challenging task given entrenched interests and 
institutions. Local organizations deemed “illegitimate” because of their association with 
militant groups for example often have more legitimacy with marginalized communities than 
NGOs. As Risse (2013: 101) points out, local non-state actors, “traditional institutions” (we 
assume he means religious organizations) and the “quintessential transnational bad guys” 
(here Risse refers to Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, both 
political parties that were democratically elected) are seen by local populations as being more 
legitimate and representative than governments. The electoral victory of Hamas, deemed as a 
terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union also highlights this 
legitimacy gap because Palestinians elected a party that had rejected the Oslo Accords, 
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opposed neoliberal reform and promoted redistributive policies while calling for the end of 
military occupation and the PA's security cooperation with Israel (Turner, 2012). After years 
of calling for free and fair democratic elections in Palestine, several Western governments 
and their donors refused to accept the results of the 2006 election of Hamas in the Gaza Strip 
(described by EU delegations as “free and fair”), thus undermining the legitimacy of the very 
political processes they wished to promulgate. A blanket refusal to engage with these groups 
by donors or governments does not address and can even exacerbate local tensions. Even 
ardent proponents of the “war on terror” appear to have softened their stance: both the United 
States government and the democratically elected government of Afghanistan are currently 
negotiating (for “political reasons”) with the Taliban, an organization that they previously 
blacklisted. 
Our findings add empirical support to theories of neoliberal development that propose 
how particular forms of development transform relationships between individuals and 
institutions (Escobar, 1995). In the Palestinian context regimes of international aid 
transformed the economic and social realities of local organizations who found themselves 
becoming increasingly disembedded from the needs and aspirations of the communities they 
were supposed to “empower” and “develop” due to donor-driven priorities. NGOization of 
the economy also resulted in new forms of exclusion and inclusion and contestations between 
a new class of urban middle class professionals working in NGOs and the older generation of 
activists that were involved in grassroots organizations. Fluency in English, ability to write 
grant proposals, and submit reports became the new criteria to assess the performance of civil 
society actors creating new divisions between rural/urban, English/Arabic speakers, pro or 
against Oslo, professional technocrat/political activist (Hanafi & Tabar, 2003). NGOs 
competed for funding based on their ability to demonstrate their “professionalization”, which 
inevitably meant separating politics from development, eschewing nationalistic visions and 
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distancing themselves from any religious organizations however representative or legitimate, 
essentially becoming an “anti-politics machine” (Ferguson, 1990: 176).  
Depoliticization does not mean an absence of politics but marks a shift in relations of 
power where collective interests can only be voiced through private individualistic and 
market driven mechanisms. Such a shift narrows the scope of political debate to focus on 
providing efficient market based solutions to poverty and social welfare suppressing alternate 
political ideologies that could be seen as a threat to neoliberal development policies. Such 
policies that constructed poverty as a “technical problem” specifically excluded politics from 
development and the peace process to the extent that local NGOs applying for funding were 
instructed not to include words like “military occupation”, “economic apartheid”, or 
“colonialism” in their proposals (Meinzer, 2019). The Oslo Accords transformed the politics 
of anti-colonial struggle to a developmental aid regime and consequent normalization of 
occupation (Dana, 2015). NGOization of the Palestinian political economy involved new 
forms of cultural and economic colonialism fostering “privatization from below” that 
depoliticized local struggles and undermined resistance (Petras, 1999: 432).  
Neoliberal state building in Palestine is contingent on an artificial separation of 
economics from politics that promotes the illusion that “economic peace” can somehow 
overcome the realities of colonial occupation. Palestinian NGOs as a result of international 
aid became constituted as a globalized elite through a “transnational subjective formation, in 
which local actors’ actions are foregrounded by debates, development paradigms and 
international standards, which are not bound in their local context” (Hanafi & Tabar, 2003: 
210). When efficient delivery of public services replaces political struggle, occupation 
becomes normalized. Social justice becomes another service to be delivered efficiently, 
which essentially means living under an efficiently organized occupation administered by the 
Palestinian Authority. Donors are also complicit in the institutional normalization of 
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occupation. For instance, when Israeli military forces damage or destroy donor-funded 
projects and infrastructure, donor agencies do not mount any legal claims for reparation or 
compensation. Instead, they fund rebuilding and rehabilitation efforts (Murad, 2014). 
Governance failures in Palestine cannot be separated from the realities of occupation and no 
amount of technocratic governance reforms can address the role of the Israeli government in 
these failures (Springer, 2015).  
 
Conclusion 
Regimes of international aid in Palestine have interpellated local NGOs into a global 
agenda that promotes particular forms of governance that serve interests of Western donor 
countries and agencies. The transformation of what was a vibrant political civil society to a 
depoliticized civic civil society normalizes the occupation while constraining forms of 
resistance. Social relations are disembedded from the local context and re-embedded in new 
relations with international donor organizations and Western governments and the resultant 
depoliticized public sphere then becomes a model for global governance (Hanafi & Tabar, 
2003). International actors dominate non-state governance in areas of limited statehood, yet 
little is known about how the “universal” norms they promote undermine local traditions and 
voices (Azzizi & Jamali, 2016). Contrary to Baur and Palazzo’s (2011) assertion, the moral 
legitimacy of Palestinian NGOs cannot be assessed through the norms of democracy, 
deliberative or otherwise. If NGOs’ moral legitimacy are to be judged by Baur and Palazzo’s 
procedural criteria of civil and consensual behavior, then our analysis shows that “morally 
legitimate” NGOs serve to legitimize what is undoubtedly an immoral occupation. 
It will be a formidable challenge to reverse this process. Instead of focusing on 
capacity building of Palestinian communities and NGOs, what is needed is building the 
capacity of international donors to be more aligned with the needs and aspirations of local 
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communities. Perhaps identifying “solidarity donors” – international donors that fund local 
organizations who are more focused on mass mobilization of communities rather than 
efficient service delivery – may offer new forms or resistance against the depoliticization that 
results from NGOization (Meinzer, 2019). If professionalization of NGOs has led to 
depoliticization then it becomes necessary for activists to “deprofessionalize” in order to 
build relations with vulnerable communities (Kamat, 2004). 
What then happens to resistance in areas of limited statehood? Mass mobilization, 
which was the hallmark of political struggle before the NGOization of Palestine, is becoming 
increasingly difficult in the West Bank. Middle class Palestinians are reluctant to mobilize 
because their interests are tied to NGOs or the PA (the largest employer in the region). 
Instead their various service delivery, gender empowerment and entrepreneurship skills and 
training projects legitimize Israeli occupation. Activists who protest Israeli occupation and 
governance failures of the PA find themselves in a revolving door between Israeli and PA 
jails because they are arrested (and often tortured) by both the Israeli forces and the PA 
security forces often for the same offence and the same charges (Tartir, 2019). However, 
despite the somewhat bleak picture we have painted of state building in Palestine it is 
important to realize that resistance is ongoing. The “Great March of Return” protests in Gaza 
which started in March 2018 where tens of thousands of people protested at the border 
demonstrates that resistance is alive. This resistance is not being led by urban middle class 
NGO leaders but is happening in refugee camps, small towns and villages in the West Bank 
and in Gaza (Hanafi & Tabar, 2003). Resistance in Palestine has taken many forms since the 
Nakba – from armed struggle to more popular forms of direct action including 
demonstrations, strikes, civil disobedience, boycott of settlement products as well as practices 
of everyday resistance – described as sumud (steadfastness). Sumud is seen as a form of 
passive cultural resistance and steadfastness in the face of occupation. In more recent years 
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due to increased Israeli militarization, settlement expansion and an increasing disenchantment 
with the PA, activists have called for a more active form of sumud that looks to the future and 
a willingness to confront both Israeli authorities and the PA. Other popular non-violent 
movements like the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) and Stop the Wall create new 
forms of collective identity that can lead to repoliticization of the public sphere and perhaps 
the basis of a stateless democracy (Jad, 2007). If regimes of international aid and NGOization 
have separated the civic from the political then the task for scholars and activists is to 
envision development strategies that can articulate a relationship between development and 
resistance through a process of collective action. 
Perhaps it is fitting to end the article with a quote from Under Siege a poem by the 
Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish: 
“Here on the slopes of hills, facing the dusk and the cannons of time 
Close to the gardens of broken shadows 
We do what prisoners do, 
And what the jobless do 
We cultivate hope”. 
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Year Key Events 
1917 End of Ottoman rule.  Jerusalem captured by British forces. 
1917 Balfour Declaration supporting a national home for the Jewish people in 
Palestine 
1922-1948  British Mandate period. Land west of the Jordan River under direct 
British administration until 1948.  
1948 Arab-Israeli war. Establishment of the State of Israel. West Bank annexed 
by Jordan. Gaza Strip controlled by Egypt. The beginning of the Nakba 
(catastrophe) for Palestinians. Hundreds of villages destroyed and  more 
than 700,000 Palestinians expelled. 
1967  The six-day war. Israel occupies West Bank including East Jerusalem.  
 
1987  First Intifada (Uprising) began in December as a grassroots movement 
involving resistance and civil disobedience.  
 
1993 Oslo Accords signed. Establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as 
an interim (5 years) body to administer the West Bank. 
 
2000-2005 Second Intifada erupts in September 2000. Gaza Strip under total siege. 
Operation Defensive Shield launched by the Israeli army in 2002. 
 
2005 End of Second Intifada. Israeli forces withdraw from Gaza Strip. 
 
2007-
present  
Gaza Strip and West Bank administration split after conflict between two 
main Palestinian parties. 2014 Israel-Gaza war. 
 
 
 
Table 1: A Brief Timeline of Palestine’s History 
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 Positions Number and Gender 
(F= Female; 
M=Male) 
NGO 1  
Founded 
1993 
Executive director, deputy general director, branch 
managers, technical officers, financial director, program 
directors and coordinators 
 
16 (1 F; 15 M) 
NGO 2 
Founded 
1977 
 
General director, General Assembly (GA) members, board 
of directors (BOD), former employees, donors, 
beneficiaries, founders, former volunteers, farmers, program 
coordinators, consultants, director of advocacy & lobbying. 
34 (14 F; 20 M) 
NGO 3 
Founded 
1985 
GA members, BOD, public relations officer, administrative 
assistant, women’s health program directors, primary health 
directors, medical center directors, health educators. 
36 (21 F; 15 M)  
NGO 4 
Founded 
1987 
Current & former general directors, members of GA & 
BOD, volunteers, founders, project coordinators, ministry of 
culture representatives, administrative assistant,  
24 (8 F; 16 M) 
NGO 5  
Founded 
1978 
Current & former general directors, founding volunteers, 
fieldworkers, director of local accountability, director of 
international accountability, fundraising officer, financial 
director, coordinator of visual documentation, head of 
training unit, coordinator of the council of human rights, 
members of GA & BOD, ministry of justice representatives, 
victims of human rights violations,  
35 (7 F; 28 M) 
Total  5 NGOs, interviews with multiple respondents occupying 
various positions 
145 (51 F; 94 M)  
 
Table 2 
The Sample 
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First order codes Illustrative quotes 
 
Formalization and 
reporting 
 
“We started to receive instructions to professionalize and formalize the 
work of our organization. It is very important to professionalize our 
interventions” (Program Officer, NGO1). 
 
Project based approach “ We started accepting irrelevant projects, I remember one of the 
projects, which was on recycling, it had nothing to do with our own 
interests as individuals, or of our organization and neither did we have 
the qualifications” (Community Development Officer, NGO 3). 
 
English language as 
power  
“Proposal writing is the criterion even for promotion, and if you cannot 
write in English, then you feel threatened” (Advocacy Officer, NGO2). 
 
Employment relations “Having projects-based contract, and core based contract, created 
another form of internal tension amongst the staff, and the type of 
contract became an ultimate objective for many of them” (Consultant, 
NGO2). 
  
Individualism versus 
collectivity 
“I think the program is a good fit because it contributes to elevating the 
level of individual thinking, it liberates individualism to optimize their 
hidden capabilities, and tap their talents and interests for improvement” 
(Project Officer, NGO4). 
 
Participants versus 
beneficiaries  
 “Through organizational restructuring we shifted from grassroots 
organization into a professional one, which distanced our relationships 
with our farmers. We are drifting away from our values; the love of 
people has been replaced by professionalization and impersonal 
structures” (Program Officer and former GA member, NGO2). 
 
Donor priorities  “Donors avoided funding any projects in Area C, which are illegal Israeli 
settlements, although we insisted that we need to reclaim the land. We 
had to adapt to their conditions” (Director, Land Reclamation, NGO2). 
 
Service delivery “Our medical and health related work is not influencing the Palestinian 
society anymore, as we just deliver services. Because we are under 
occupation we need a different approach, where we consider health more 
holistically and not just as a provider of services” (Chairman, NGO3). 
 
Training and education “Our purpose is clear: we work in education, and we do not want to 
interfere or engage in politics.  I think this is one of our strengths that we 
do not belong to political parties. We had to assuage the concerns of 
parents of their children that we work with that we only focus on 
education, and we have nothing to do with politics” (Program Director, 
NGO1). 
 
Nationalism “(The Palestinian International Festival for Music and Dance) was a 
perfect nationalistic and popular festival.  All songs were patriotic, the 
troupes were sympathetic about our situation and demonstrated that in 
their different performances” (Former General Director, NGO4). 
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Identity and culture “The intention is to organize events and conferences to stand up against 
Israelization of Jerusalem. Engagement even with irrelevant activities 
such as Dabke3, camps, drama, anything to maintain our Palestine roots 
in Jerusalem, to prove that we exist, as part of our struggle against the 
Israeli occupation” (Director of Women’s Program, NGO3). 
 
Volunteerism “Volunteering and being close to our farmers was in our view 
synonymous with resistance. While our soldiers were fighting in the war, 
volunteering to work with people was another form of fighting, we were 
fighters in agriculture” (Former General Director, NGO2). 
 
Meeting local needs “Our farmers suffered from high taxes and poor services because our 
local economy was subservient to the Israeli economy. We created mobile 
services where they were most needed, close to checkpoints for example, 
especially when direct hostilities occurred” (Director of Advocacy, 
NGO3). 
 
Partnerships “Our major aim was to cultivate partnerships with community based 
organizations all over the West Bank so we can organize music and dance 
performances in the villages instead of bringing people to the city” 
(Program Officer, NGO4). 
 
Human rights “Rights have become a motto that we all were obliged to embrace to 
please the donors. Many forces control Palestinians” life, so which rights 
we are talking about? (Director, Medical Center, NGO3). 
 
Advocacy and lobbying “The aim of advocacy and lobbying was to show international states that 
their companies are investing in a colonial system. The goal is to show 
how these companies contribute to occupation by the systematic 
exploitation of Palestinian resources” (Head of international advocacy, 
NGO5). 
 
 
Table 3 
Illustrative Quotes 
 
  
                                                        
3 Dabka is an Arab/Palestinian folk dance.  
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